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CHAPTER I
ZBM PROBLEM AND PURPOSE
.
f« Statement of the purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate and to evaluate
the Idea of God in the philosophy of Josiah Royoe» This is an ef-
fort to determine Royee f s treatment of certain principles which
are essential to his conception of God. Hence, the aim will lead
to a consideration of the following questions; What is the nature
of reality? How is the finite related to the infinite? How does
Royce account for evil? "noes he conceive of God as conserver of
other persons? Is individual freedom possible in his system? The
purpose of this thesis, then, is to make an investigation of ?_oyce
theory of God and to present the facts that are found,
2# Statement of the problem
The problem with whioh this thesis is concerned is a correct
statement of the idea of God. One of th*» fundamental problems of
philosophy of religion is to determine the valid idea of God.
There are many different ideas of God. The beFt known conceptions
ares polytheism, henotheism, pantheism, agnostic realism, humanism
impersonal idealism, religious naturalism, and theism.' All of
these views cannot be equally valid. God cannot be the whole of
reality and at the same time the eternal creator and conserver
1. Brightman, POR, 1 33-1 61 . (For the meaning of abbreviated
references in this thesis consult the authors T names in the Bib-
liography at the back of this thesis.
)
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of values, for if God is the universe, he cannot be its creator.
Personal theism 2 ig a highly approved idea of God. God is
here defined as an eternally conscious person* His personality includes an
eternal will which is limited by the eternal lav;s of reason and the eternal
brute fact of nature. The eternal laws of reason and. the brute fact are not
external to God, but aspects of God*s conscious experience. There is noth-
ing external to, and also coeternal v/ith, divine p3rsonality. God is the
only eternal being. God, therefore, is the eternal person who controls all
that is, and creates and. conserves other persons,
Nov/, conflicting conceptions do not change God. God is and always will
be God. But different ideas of God that have been advanced by various phi-
losophers and different religions make a problem for believers in God. If
religion believers can be asru*ed that the idea of God around which they
center their faith is coherent, ' they will be spared many tragic blunders
in their religious experiences.
In the final analysis the problem of this thesi3 may be narrowed do\/n
to the religious validity of Royce's idea of God. This thesis seeks to an-
swer one fundamental question: Does the conception of God as the v/hole of
reality give fruitful results to religious believers?
3. Principal sources of material
Royce's major statement of his metaphysical position is found in his
Gifford Lectures. These lectures are published in two volumes entitled
2TMghtman, rd., 336-341, 157,
3. Brightman, I- OR, 128.

3.
The ,orld and the Individual * These volumes contain an elaborated account
of the absolute as a personal God. The criticisms of Joyce's position are
not sufficient!;'- concentrated to give in a brief statement.
4. Method of Investigation
The met; od. used in this thesis is the synoptic method of philosophy, ^
The criticisms offered follow the line of internal and external critics
of Rome's position. The major criticisms are internal and also unfavor-
able to certain aspects of Royce^ position but favorable to a valid idea
of God. 5
4 . Brightman, ITi , 27.
5 • For explanation of the terms internal, external, favorable, and
unfavorable criticisms, see Brightman, PC*:, k39'AfrOj 459-461.

CHAPTER II
R0TCE»5 SYSTEM AND METHOD
1« Influences on Royce
Royce, like other philosophers, was influenced by some of the thinkers
who came before him. There has been some debate about the major influence
to
on him. Different writ rs have aserdbed/Royce influence from different
philosophers. Regarding this question you nay consider first what Hoyce
has to say about the persons under whose influence he has b ?en. Secondly,
you may consider the opinions of men who have evaluated Hoyce* s system,
and also the systems of the men under which. Royce* s system appears to be.
In the third place, you will need to consider an epitome of influence on
Royce.
i. Royce* s statement . Royce-*- views Hegel in two r .spects, namely, the
Hegel of idealism, and the Hegel of the dialectic method. The former char-
acteristic of Hegel, Royce graciously accepts; but the latter he denies.
Hegel's teachings about truth are free to all, therefore, Royce acknowledges
his indebtedness to Hegel; but Royce insists that he "cannot call himself
an Hegelian, as much as he owes to Hegel. "2 ROVCe n^os n clear state-
ment about Ms position relative to men who have had influence on bin.
Speaking of the men who influenced his work, Royce named such men as:
LeConte, Sill, Lotr.e, Schopenhauer, Spencer, Till. TJut Royce never considered
himself "very strongly under the influence of Hegel. Royce accepts Kant
1. Royce, '>"•./. r, x.
2. Royce, RAP, 3d.
3« Royce, HGC, 130, see also Royce, RAP, x.
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as a major influence on Ms thought, and considers himself a member of the
post-Kantian school. 4-
ii» An estimate of influences on Royce by other thinkers. Among; men
who discuss influences on Royce this thesis recognises: Fuller, Eraushaar,
WHgtltlMMlj Tidily, Powers, Cohen, and Johnson* By virtue of certain elements
in the philosophical system of Royce, Fuller recognizes Royce as under the
influence of Hegel, and classifies Royce as a nec—Hegelian V/hen co.mmenting
on Royce and other philosophers, Kraushaar says that they looked at Kant
mostly through Hegel. • Professor Brightman finds Royce under the influence
of Hegel, because Royce makes use of the logical method which i3 character-
istic of Hegelian thinkers. 7 Rogers says that as an American philosopher,
Royce "departs less widely from the Hegelian position." Thilly states
that Royce was influenced by Kant and was also a member of the post-Kantian
School. ^ Cohen concludes that Royce was led to philosophy through various
influences, the chief among whom were Kant, Kegel, Schelling, and Schopen-
hauer.-^ Professor Johnson, in his analysis of Royce' s philosophical growth,
recognizes Kant» Fichte, ana" Schopenhauer, as influential in the
development Of Royce T s mental biography. 11
iii. -Synopsis of influence on Royce . As the first great American
idealist, oyce stands under the influence of German, British, and American
thinkers. Relative to the influence of Kant or Hegel, you may say that
Kant and Hegel have traits in common, therefore, to an extent, the works of
Royco may reflect both thinkers. B A you may conclude that the primary in-
4. Royce, RAP, ix; PC, I, xi-xii; SCffij iv.
5. Runes, Di
,
160, 274*
6. Runes, DP, 160.
7. Brightman, IT?
,
391; see also Brightman, I '.R, 1-3.
3. Rogers, SHT, 505-506.
9. Thilly, RPf 49.
10. Trent, CHAL, III, 244.
11. Johnson, RPR, 6-10.
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terest of Royce' s system reflects Hegelian metl^od. However, this may be
clue to Kant's influence on Regel,
2, Idealism in Royce
i. Mot Roy/ce's personal doctrine , Royce says that he has "no doctrine
to teach save the one that history has taught."-^ The doctrines go on for-
ever. 'Sac: • :Mlos pher uses the one which best carries his thought and ex-
plains his opinion. The truth of a philosopher's doctrine is merely a dis-
covery and a contribution to thought by that philosopher. The truth of
philosophy is eternal. The philosopher does not bring anything into being,
"Others create."^ The philosopher interprets experience as he sees it.
He tries to approach the facts on the basis of the available material, and
in that way he contributes to the enlightenment of men,
ii. vfliy Royce is an idealist
.
Seeking the true meaning of human ex-
perience, Royce turns away from the notion of cause, for he found the doc-
trine of cause inadequate to furnish a thorough interpretation of experience.
The facts about the physical world Royce left for the scientist, and gave
his attention to an effort to determine the total meaning of experience,
Royce discovered that man was ignorant of the whole meaning of experience.
So, in human ignoranee Royce found reason to believe in a world-self that
possessed the knowledge for which he was seeking. Thus, the principles of
idealism furnished a sufficient working basis for Royce 's philosophy,^
iii. Aspects of idealism
. But Royce calls to our attention two aspects
of idealism, and the meaning of each. The first, which is preparatory to
Sn&fMj 3" r, 343.
13. Royce, Si:;, 342.
14« Royce, MP, 349.

the second, has been followed by such men as Fichte, "orkeley, and Huxley.
This view is that the vorld is made of "such stuff as ideas are. p.oyce
does not classify himself as one who wholly concludes to this analytic type
of ideal:' sn, for it le-ds to the unicnowable
.
Royce identifies himself as
supporting the second view which is a "synojjftic analytic conception. "lb
This view, aftfj ported by Plato and Hegel,^ is that there is an all-knowing
mind or self which is universal. Hoyce calls this self: "logos, problem
solver, all-knower.
3. Signs of Voluntarism
i. Hoyce 1 s acl^nowledgemert
.
iar^in the philosophical career of Royce,
he acknowledges the influence thnt Schopenhauer had on hisu^ This indorse-
ment of Schopenhauer at once leads one to expect signs of voluntarism here
and there in the philosophy of Roycc.
ii. Dewey 1 s ap; raisal . In the philosophy of Hoyce, John Dewey finds
marked influence of the power of will :'n moral judgment,^ in gaining knowl-
edge of objects,21 in the inowing process of the perfect loiower,^ who is
acquainted with and transconds evil, and also in Royce* s ethical theory. ^3
iii. Loewenberr.' s appraisal . As a result of careful investigation and
evaluation of the philosopldcal works of Royce, Loewenberg has discovered
15. Royce, 3MP, 351.
16. Royce, Sff*, 364.
17. 3ri.ch.tman, KH, 1C3? ITP, 3-6.
IB, Hoyce, SHI
, 379.
19. Royce, PISt, 232.
20. Hoyce, Hill, 23.
21. Hoyce, IHR, 17.
22. Hoyce, FHR, 24.
23. hoyce, PER, 25.

awhat he calls "the deepest a.-d most abiding r.»tivos"24 Qf Royce' s voluntar-
ism. This dordnant sign is seen in Eoyce T s interest in man's will and
passion. Throughout the works of Hoyce is found emphasis on the purpose of
the Absolute 'ill.
4» A Surraaary of Royce' s System and Method
i. Through the eyes of others, America* a ~.ost original thinker is
differently interpreted by different philosophers. What is his system or
doctrine? V/hat is his method? If you listen to Royce, he tells you that he
has nc doctrine of his own, neiliier does he 3eek novelty in method. were
you to listen to Santayana, he would tell you: "His q | roach to anything
or
was oblique."*--' To raise the question to Johnson, you liear of a man whose
"method is to take these incomplete experiences and follow them through to
their logical conclusion."^ Loewenberg tells U3 that Royce* s mental biography
is of ro3t-Kantian type. ^7 Cohen traces Royce from a metaphysical idealist to
a realist.^ Thilly sees Royce esca ing "intellectualism by emphasizing the
place of the individual self in the Absolute self."**? And thus, you have a
fairly confused picture of Royce. Therefore, let us look at Royce through
our own e:es.
ii. Statement of summary
.
Looking at Royce one may summarize his
system by 3aying that Royce is an absolute idealist of Hegelian type. His
whole system is built around an idealistic interpretation of the absolute*
The philosophical method which Royce uses is synoptic. He begins by inter-
24. Royce, Ffl, 11.
25. Santayana, CGU3, 98.
26. Johnson, Rl-R, 14.
27. Royce, LTI, xi.
20. Trent, CHAL, 247.
29. Thilly, Hi, 561.
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preting the history of thought in a given field. Then he nakes a critical
analysis of his findings* And from the analysis he goes to the whole to
view the relation of the constituent parts, "-oyce* s primary interest is
in totality of consciousness.

CHAPT ,R III
QE ! REALITY 0? ABSOLUT:; FA'i r-:PJ3RCS
Royco says that experience is real. The nature of reality according
to Royce is the subject v&th which the discussion in this chapter is con-
cerned. From the early philosophical speculation;; to the latest doctrines
of modem philosophy, the nature of reality has been the paramount question
of philosophical deb te. Different philosophers have used various approach*,
to this subject. But, Royce arrives at the subject and proceeds to reach
his conclusion on the basis of experience* From finite experience he gives
reasons for belief in the ei-istence of absolute experience* This done,
?.oyce establishes proof for the reality of absolute experience* To ar-
rive at Royce 's conclusion one must give attention to the meaning of ex-
perience.
1* The ttPimliHf °£ experience
In a particular oen3e the object of this whole thesis is to determine
the meaning of experience. Therefore, no one part of this viork can be con-
sidered a complete development of the topic, nevertheless, one raust have
so.^e general idea of what Ro;/ce means by experience before the subject can
be intelligently approached. It is tjcII to begin by considering the meanin
of man's private experience and the meaning of hiiman experience in general.
i. Man's private experience . Clear your mind of sense perception.
Royce does not mean that vihatever comes to man by means of his senses alone
constitutes man's private experience. The forr of human consciousness is
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determined by the short time-span of human experience. By man's private
experience "vie mean what a man now has present to his consciousne so.
All that is the present awareness of an individual constitutes that per-
son ' s private oxi.erience. This experience is private because no person,
except the person who is conscious of this experience, has access to this
experience. Man's private experience cannot be enjoyed by another. It is
the possession of the individual.
The terra "present" as used in this definition refers to the "time-span 1'
of consciousness. The present consciousness is characterized by the length
of time one can be aware of a Waning. Royce speaks of the present or now,
as the span in which successive events occur. He refers to the present
exi^rience as the individual's experience of a complete series of events
that can be taken in one mental grasp. This single grasp of meaning has
one intent.' on and a composite unity. This unity is like the sound of the
eight syllables in the diatonic scale: each syllable has its unified re-
lation to every other syllable, thus the whole series can be given one
unified meaning. Royce says, "we never mean the indivisible now of an
ideal mathematical time. Therefore, that which is present to the
individual's consciousness is neither the present minute, hour, nor a long
period of time. It is an instant. Rut, the present is not an indivisible
instant, for nothing could occur in a pure instant. The individual's
present experience includes different internal meanings of past and future.
It is important to note the difference betv;ccn the meaning which
Royce gives for o oilcnee and that which Dewey gives. 'V: experience Dewey
means that which is shown as a result of the effect of external objects
1. Royce, VJ, II, 12. See also Royce, J, I, ££H&&
2. Royce, ,1, II, 130.

upon the human organism. Dewey holds that "ex
:
erience as an interaction
consists of connections betaken doinf»-^dergoin|3-doin'-...r{5uch interact!one]
give rise to the distinctly cognitive experience. "3 says that he
begins with experience as the manifestation of interactions of organism
and environment. Thus, Dewey recognises experience as including all events
in nature which affect consciousness. V;hen organism and environment inter-
act and produce consciousness you get a very different state of affairs from
that which Royce refers to when he speal.es of experience as the present
xsoreness of an individual. By private experience Royce means anything in
the consciousness of a person.
Royce' s view of experience is different from that of Pewey but is
similar to that of Professor Brightman. Professor Brightman and Royce agree
on the definition of present experience as what a person now has in con-
sciousness. !,xperience for i ro feasor Brightman is "all the data and proc-
esses of consciousness*"^ In this sense experience includes all that a per-
son at any instant i3 conscious of. But objects are never in this present
consciousness for Professor Brightman. They are referred to. It i3 at
this point where Royce differs from Professor Brightman. Royce includes
ideas and t'..eir objects, while irofessor Brightman includes idea3 which
refer to objects that are external to consciousness. cvertheless, on the
principal issue at stake in the present discussion, both agree that ex-
perience is all that a person has in consciousness at any instant. They
also agree that the foundation of consciousness is divine personality. ^
3. - J' , 532.
/>. Brightman, FOR, 413.
5. Brightman, PGR, 41A.
6. Brightman, ITP, 339; POR, 367. See also Royce, I, II, 330.
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ii. Hunan experience . The tent; "human experience" is used by Royce
in two senses. Man's private experience, as defined, is the first sense in
which he uses the term. The second sense in which Royce uses t!>e term
applies to a much broader collection of events. Royce says that this use
of the term refers to facts ?/hich are said to have been experienced by
various men at various times. But this is never the present experience of
anyone. 7 As true as it is that no man lias verified the private experience
of another, so it 3 s that no ran has ever verified human experience.& But
man's private experience gives evidence of experience other than private
experience. However, all you have is your private experience. From that
you can h fer the reality of any fact. Royce insists that man's private
experience is man's only guide. ' Thus the term human experience refers to
the human type of experience, namely, man's private experience, the present
experience of any individual self.
2. The Transcendent Nature of Human Experience
Royce 's conception of human experience is difficult to grasp. The
present experience has its peculiar relation to what was in the immediate
past and what is to be in the immediate future. Present experience is such
a fragment that the conscious person is not fully a^are of what is being
experienced. Thus the present becor.es mysterious. Royce says: "I am con-
scious just now, but I am not wholly conscious of ny consciousness."-^ No
man ever gets full expression of all that his present experience means at
the instant of consciousness. Therefore, attention io directed to the veri-
fied present.
7TRoyce, ,'J, I, 365.
3. Royce, SRI, 4o; WI, I, 364.
9. Royce, =,1, II, 23.
10. Royce, V,I, II, 18.
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i, Verified present experience . The extent of verification in present
human experience is the object of the present discussion. Royce holds that
'"hat is verified in present human consciousness when facts are experienced
is all that is present in consciousness except the fact tliat the verifica-
tion itself is a fact unverified. In the words of Royce: "I shall verify
without being av.'are that I do so,"^ In this natter Royce brings one face
to face wit'< an unconscious consciousness. If it were not for this state
of aviareness, Royce insists that the extent of present verification would
be infinite. For each fact that is verified requires a verification of
so
the verification itself and/on ad infirdtum. This process of verification
could never be completed in present human experience. For, if every soldier
who marches into caup is to be verified by a soldier who marches in behind
him, all the soldiers v.ill never get into camp.
Partial verification gives evidence of a reference in present ex-
perience to facts beyond present experience, "The verification of the facts
of this present experience, has more Being than I am now able to observe. "l^
If each egg contains a chick, and each chick contains an egg, there will
always be an uncounted chicle. The exact number of chicks will always be in
the future,
ii. Reference of present experience . Each egg contains evidence of
another. Svery moment of finite experience is unfulfilled. The fulfilment
of present experience requires a consciousness that is capable of verifying
the infinite 3eries of fact3 that accompanies present experience. The nature
of present experience is f,to point beyond what is presented, for the sake of
11, Royce, WL, II, 20,
12. Royce, VJ, II, 19.
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defining the very fulfilment tfcich our present meanings demand. tt"P When
you question the possibility of such a reference or self-transcendence of
present experience, Royce points to the special imderlying categories of
experience. These categories throw light on the kind of activity involved
in a .moment of consciousness, hen a person is conscious, he knows facts.
•»ach fact has the quality of referring beyond itself to another fact, hence,
all facts are never verified in present human consciousness. This 5 s true
because each finite idea seeks the real being or "Other" of human experience.
"A fact is for me, at any moment, that which 1 ought to recognize as
determining or as limiting what I am here conscri ously to do."l^- Human ex-
perience is, in a sense, that will of the individual to be compelled by
facts. Therefore, a fact of experience ma3r be defined as that which is re-
cognized in connection vdth an attempt at action. You know thnt what you
actually verify is not all that you mean. In order to have complete meaning
more facts ought to be verified. Hence, you must determine Royce* s use of
ought in present human experience.
iii. The nature of "Ought" in human experience . The ought in human
experience is like the ought of Ethics. Both oughts are assertions of the
will. Roth urge the individual to what should b . 'hat you experience is
your own will to be compelled by facts. *S In each of your finite experiences
a purpose is embodied. "I'y Ought is my own will more rationally expressed
than. ..I as yet consciously recognize."-^ You know that you are not con-
scious of your full meaning because the existence of the ought tells you
13. Royce, I, II, 22. See also :.rI, I, 59-60 for the "Other" of human
experience.
lif. Royce, I, II, 30.
15. Royce, 1 1, II, 30.
16. Royce, BX, II, 39.
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that there is nore than you should verify. If you do ret verify all that -
you ought to verify, your scaning is incomplete. This incompleted part of
your meaning is necessary to your present experience if your purpose is to
be fulfilled, -ihen yo a acknowledge the ought of your present experience, that
ought is an act of will. There is also a "mu3t" related to the "ought.. " In
this acknowledgement of constraint, Royce insists that the compelling force
is not wholly other than the individual's will. *7 By defining the categories
of the ought you will understand the nature of the ouglit in present ex-
perience.
(1) Objective . The first subjective category of the ought is the ob-
jectivity of particular facts. All facts that experience suggests are ob-
jective. They are facts other than what you now find presented to you, as
relative fulfilment of your experience. Tliese facts seem foreign to your
will. Hence, you believe them to be external, to yourself. Tliese facts do
resist your present desire, but they are not external to you as they seen. 18
The objectivity is subjective to the ought of your own experience.
( 2) Subjective . The foundation for recognition of facts is subjective.
"Ho fact can furnish to us, wholly from without, the evidence that it ex-
ists. "19 Unb the person recognizes that his present will is limited and
controlled, he likewise recognizes that only through this control can his
will win its determinate embodiment. Therefore, it is the person's own
will to aclmowledge objective limitations to his will.
(3) Teleological« The objective and subjective qualities of the ought
17. Royce, I, II, 39.
18. Royce, Vfl, II, 41-42.
19. Royce, iff, II, 42.
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of present experience are brought together in purpose. All .facts are teleo-
logical. ^0 The ought of present experience points to the end for which all
facts exist. livery fact has its subjective origin and its objective refer-
ence, but the essence of all facts is constituted by a universal teleology.
Royce builds his system on purpose.
Now the ought of present experience has two aspects. These tw aspects,
namely, subjectivity and objectivity, are united in the purpose of experience.
The objective factor may be defined as the external .leaning of an idea. On
the other hand, the subjective factor may be defined as the internal mean-
21ing of an idea. This theory >7ill be nore fully de\reloped in a considera-
tion of the relation of idea and experience. But before talcing up Royce 1 s
theory of ideas, a person mil profit if he notices the limitation of human
experience, and the experience of the mystic.
In turning to the limitation of human experience it vd.ll be well to
remember that human experience is transcendent. The transcendent nature of
human experience lie3 in the teleological nature of the ought of present ex-
perience.
3. The Limitation of Human Experience
Royce conceives human experience as United. Human experience, by
virtue of the teleological ought, is transcendent. Human experience
transcends itself, but not the integral or complete experience. 22 There-
fore, the problem which is here confronted i3 to describe the nature of
this limitation.
20. Royce, ./I, II, 42.
21. Royce, ,71, II, 39-40.
22. Royce, ' I, II, 24; 5RI, 143-LL9 ; CG, 151.
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i. The character of the limitation. The general character of the
limitation of human experience is its short "time-span.." Human experience
is fragmentary. The tine-span of consciousness not only determines the forn
of human consciousness but also the limit of human consciousness. Hence
the individual's present experience conveys a limited range of the facts
that express Ms vail, and gives in part the meaning of his consciousness.
You grasp witVJLn the narrow Iimit3 of this instant a part of a meaning
which you cannot consistently understand unless you relate the fragment
to a wider range of experience. 23 Human consciousness is at once trans-
cended and also included in larger experience. The fact that human ex-
ijerience is included in a v&der experience is evidence of its limitation.
ii. Re& lit of this limitation. T>ie limitation of human experience
has a unique result. According to Royce you have experiences but you don't
know the whole meaning of your experience; hor do you lenaw more than a
fragment of the facts that express your will. If your limited experience
is a fragment; there must be a Uiole of which it is a part* The facts
that you verify are known to you, also the facts that you do not verify
must be known to some experience or else they are not facts. The true
nature of the limitation lies in human ignorance, for these facts must be
known facts. 24 Therefore, you view your present experience in terms of the
"Ought" of human experience. This result implies a .Tenter experience.
Shla greater e:--:>erience will verify all that you ou.-ht, even now, to verify.
Human experience, then, in its limitation, confirms the existence of a com-
plete experience. 25
STRovco, ul, I, 421; II, 25.
24. Royce, .1, II, 63.
25. r.oyce, t /I, II, 330.

19.
4. Relation of Mysticism to 'Experience
Royce has done considerable work in the field of inysticism. His treat-
ment or exposition of the subject is extensive. Royce* s interest in mys-
ticism nay be due to several reasons, among which some nay be stated. This
interest may be due to Royce' s interpretation of human experience. The
theory of the mystic invites this interest because the mystic builds his
conception of reality on experience alone. In the second place, Royce holds
that, since so much philoss phical misunderstanding has existed with refer-
ence to mysticism, 26 the mystic needs to be given an adequate interpreta-
tion. Then, there is close relation between Royce 1 s theorv of bein- and that
of the mystic. ^7 Again mysticism challenges Roj'Ce , s attention because of
its great amount of influence on the individual and on religion.*40 However,
in order to justify a treatment of the subject in this thesis, attention
must be given to the meaning, characteristics and assertions of mysticism.
i. The meaning of mysticism. A definition of mysticism will help to
understand its relation to this thesis. Mysticism may be generally defined
by means of the peculiar conception of reality involved in this doctrine.
I'ost philosophical doctrines define reality as an objective quality, but
mysticism, and Royce 1 s absolute idealism, define reality as subjective. The
mystic, according to Royce, defines reality as that which is experienced
when the satisfied individual ceases to think. ^9 Reality is absolutely
and finally immediate. Being for the mystic is the goal of his desire. The
individual becomes one with reality. His ideal is wholly reached. "Being
26V Royce, I, I, 77-79.
27. Royce, V/I, I,
23. Royce, I, 77-76.
29. Royce, .71, I, 33.
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is the longed-for goal of our desire. "3^ The experience of the mystic not
only reaches its goal but also establishes tho fact of reality.
ii. The foundation, of cystic experiences . All mystic claims are based
on human experience. 'flie mystic longs for the satisfaction of his desires,,
and also finds Ids satisfaction in his own consciousness. 33- Royce says
that the mystic experiences his satisfaction v/ithin his heart of hearts.
If there is a reality, the n$rstic insists that it must be found vdthin his
owi experience. ESq mystic experience occurs apart from human experience.
Tlds experience occurs when an individual attempts to give a subjective
account for the real object of his finite experience. Thus for Royce the
mystic becomes the only pure empiricist, lysticism may be called a stage,
type, or phase of human experience. Human experience is the only foundation
for the claims of mysticism.
iii. The characteristics of .mysticiam . The mystic's philosophy is
characterized by its emphasis on the immediacy of human experience. Tlii3
pliilosophy opposes realism in that the realist seeks to define reality in
an objective sense. Mystics insist that reality is deeply rooted in the
nature of personal consciousness and not objective ideas. 33 Another of
mysticism* a characteristics is its appeal to the individual. Mysticism
gives tlie individual an important place in the progre salve moving of the
eternal order.34 Chief among the characteristics of mysticism is the tend-
ency on the part of some ; lystics to emphasize the mystical nature as bo-
longing to God. God himself is viewed as a mystic. Though real, the world
30. Royce, ,1, I, 61.
31. Royce, CG, lf>\ wT, I, 155.
32. Royce, V.I, I, 77.
33. Royce, " I, I, 32j cf. ..I, I, 136.
34. Royce, Y*T, I, 82-33.
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hum no hearing on Ood*. God is as cosselete after creation as ho HH before,
the perfection of nod is thoygftfc of as a fact imaAlateSy mpBsfSmstoA bj
Qod.35 The-se special characteristic features of ^psiicieja shear plainly the
interests and trie nature of s^eticissw
iv. ^^..jMipHBPttoai.o^ f&SMStSSfc ^3** finds certain a! as^rtions
I arc trtie f^r thwwhoie field of rsrstidaa* In the first alace, the
rustic asserts thsi reality is not HtK&Sgr indeperident of Iaie*?ledsc. In t2s»-
seeond
.
lace, t'vi -vatic asserts that being lilies isaedia07«
-
3£ein* tlto
i^ratic aaaertG that within the in&vi&iol is the onlv ostium that causes
fete to sec that trath, reality, and the abiding world are profonndlsr dif-
ferent from error, tesreali^, and the fleeting sonants of consciousness*
Finally, the rustic asserts that reality is anxre, and yet sal^Uon depealff
on experience of realitv'#3&
•The doctrine of the rustic has sany advantages* !?y«ticiss 1% to an
sxtoat, reflective; It a; cola to your cast c^erisnce. The reality is with-
in you. Thxm n^sticisja depends u]«n making the lndl^l<feial consider Ids
ovsi neanlng. The doc-trim is practical for Soycs* 3hen the '/.yetic rcao;?*
niaos an object ac uaaietdagg. he is only expressing his cm seed as Jonkoser.
t&sn the rustic \*&rlo reality, he 'm&m what ho mnnf Thus the r^tie
utaics ads defect, rtu,
.
-lata beyond "ae extractions. But, he cancels his
possibilities*
The result of caretdlcjffsu The systie observes Ids o*» defeat, S|j
definition the reality uhich the static seeirs is sorely tl*e coal of his
~~,a^ "o ee, 7, .7, a.
3a, "ayce, I, J, CO.

finite search* The onlj character of HillTfj (union vith God ) is
Hit lon/>ed-for goal of haaan desire* ^ben this coal is roac!ied, the sr/stic
in si a /awe point, for the tonctqg is ewer: no iror^ 3 ^nging, no goal. ,
is a rpositive ideal onlj bo long as I strive for dsath***^
If death is cTil^ the absence of life, and life bsesass present, then, there
II n-j dearth* The ^fstic deflnse 'f&s absolute as nothing but fcfee absence of
th® finite. If the Unite eoraee, the absolute is bio: tod out. Vfith this
kind of argvMRi Bo^ce refutes jasjnsfclciem and eonaielsrs it invalid*
Thus tlie j^stic r'oco not transcend hoeaan experience and. baeosse one
«lth the abaci lie* fbe r^nstie sisses his goal* Therefore fg^sticiaa does
not serve Hope's -ar-oac 1
.
?:t g f "forts to .laf.V'ie AHt; from a sal>*scfe-
ive point of view.
5* The Section of Idea and ^:pcrlenco
The studj of the "OuGht" of huoan csper&cnce reveals a peculiar ro- .
lation between the idea and its object, Hie follcxiin^ paragraphs are do~
voted to flu ezrlanation of this relation*
i* 2 leas, tip fegy to tltq real rippld* The mrld of ideas is the iaay to
the world of facts. The real world is factual* It is the aiprecse interest
of ths boean being* 3tii it presents itself in great variety* The phenoewBa
of nature* the varied huaar. activities and experiences, and ths aair/ scat-
tered thoughts and events of life are not cl intelligible to the in-
71. -e'-ce, ; 3 194* Fori llwjw'm^maiffta mouiart «f . R9B**i Uimt 1
mnt of nysticis-n see Johnson, 63-69. In these pages tfco analysis
of ?x>yce*$ position is ciisenssed under the subjects: ^Slsaple Unit^r" and
"The On*eof58 of fcwticJ sr. ''
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dividual. These event g are at once sorrowful and then joyful. The scientist
. . » The religionist
views the world as a realm of values, but he cannot correctly estimate its
worth. :Svery attempt at estimating the worth of the world is met by con-
founding circumstances which are unintelligible to the estimator. 39 The
real world presents itself in the fleeting moments of consciousness. The
individual never knows the full meaning of an instant of Ms conscious
life. Therefore in order to get an understanding of the world of facts,
Royce insists that you must approach it from the standpoint of the world
of ideas. To accept the brute world as factual is to run into a hojxjless
state of affairs. "Begin by accepting. .the brute reality of the uorld as
Fact, and you are sunk deep in an ocean of mysteries."^ Royce holds that
there must be some way of approach to the brute reality of the world. The
world of ideas serves this purpose.
ii. The meaning of an idea. Royce 's definition of an idea will help
to make clear the relation between idea and experience. This definition
must be accompanied with Royce f s definition for the general meaning of an
idea. The primary character of an idea may be defined as a state of con-
sciousness which., when present, is viewed as the expression of a conscious
purpose. Ideas appear in consciousness as having the significance of acts
of will. "An idea.
.
.does.
. .appear to be representative of a fact existent
beyond itself."^ The principal trait which makes an idea is the idea's
"inner character as relatively fulfilling the purpose. . .which is in the
33. Royce, WI, I, 17.
39. Royce, H, I, 17.
40. Royce, ,1, I, 17.
41. Royce,
.1, I, 23-24.
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consciousness of the moment herein the idea takes place. The act of
will is essentially bound up with Royce 1 s conception of an idea. An idea
may be expressed by saying: a, e, i, o, u, as long as the sounding of those
vowels embody a conscious purpose. But, on the other hand, the brutal
laugh of a person in the theatre or a person milking down the corridor is
no idea. One of the very fair ways of defining an idea is, as Eoyce puts
it, "any state of mind that has a conscious meaning. "^ Nov? an idea may
be further explained in terras of what Royce calls the internal and external
meaning of ideas.
(1) Internal, The internal weaning of the idea may bo stated best by
means of Royce f s definition of an idea. An idea, as stated, is any present
condition of mind considered as the relatively complete embodiment, and
hence, already vievjed as the incomplete fulfillment of a purpose. This
purpose, as expressed by the idea, is the idea's internal meaning. The idea
is a complex of states that presents to consciousness the expressed, yet in-
complete, fulfillment of a purpose. This purpose "when viewed as fulfilled
through the state called the idea, is the internal meaning of the idea."^+
(2) External, Eoyce holds that the external meaning of an idea is mere
apparent meaning. The external validity of an idea appears on the basis of
the idea's internal meaning. The idea refers to existing facts but these
facts do not exist beyond the idea's internal purpose. The complete mean-
ing of an idea in its full development is viewed as wholly internal, for
all apparent externa], meaning unites with the interna].. This unity of mean-
ing occurs by virtue of the purpose which the idea expresses. 45
42. Royce, ..I, I, 24.
43. Royce, V.T, I, 24.
44. Royce, -I, I, 25.
45. Royce, II, I, 320-32/+.

25.
iii. The relation of the idea to its object . An understanding of the
relation between the idea and its object will throw no small light on the
relation between idea and experience. All ideas seek their own fulfillment.
Hie intentions of ideas are the only means by which ideas may be judged.
The perceptive and the will processes of the idea are inseparable since the
idea is an incomplete fulfillment of a purpose. "The object meant by the
idea is the object because it is willed to be such, and the will in question
is the will that the idea embodies. Hence, the intention of the idea
to point out a particular object is the result of the internal meaning of
that idea. If the idea did not will this object to be its object, this
object would not be the object of the idea. But, the object of the idea is
so determined that no other object can take the place of the object in
question. Vhen the final analysis of the object-idea problem is reached,
you will find that the object is so willed and embodied in the idea that the
idea alone exists. For, as Royce says: "iihen I have an idea of the world,
ray idea is a will, and the world of ray idea is simply rry own will itself
deterninately embodied . vfhen the idea seeks its own, it is seeking its
own internal meaning or purpose. On gaining this complete purpose, the
object assumes the form of the idea and thus the two become one individual.^*
Thus for Royce there is no object, in reality, for the apparent object is
only the expression of the meaning of the idea. The relation between Koyce f 3
idea and object may be expressed in terms of the relation between a mental
figure or character and the created person or thing to demonstrate the
46. Royce, I, I, 325.
47. Royce, I, I, 327.
4B. Royce, ..I, I, 337.
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meaning of the mental figure. Thus Amo3 and Andy only exist as the intent
of their portrayors.
iv. The intimate relation between idea and, experience . From the find-
ings of the above investigation, it is an easy matter to state the relation
between idea and human experience. An idea was defined as a state of mind
that has a conscious meaning. The internal, unfulfilled purpose of the
idea is the idea's internal meaning. The external meaning of the idea is
only apparent. The object does not really exist. Human experience has been
defined as one's v;hole consciousness of his present meaning, what, then,
can be said of the relation between idea and experience? In the first place,,
ideas are the only real things for Royce, but, in the second place, ideas
are rcnl only in as much as they are verified by experience. Royce holds
that the real world is a life fulfilling the pur oses of idea3. "That idea
expresses Being which ic found to be confirmed by experience. "49 An idea
is a fragment of experience which partially fulfills a purpose. I&tperienii
is demanded to fulfill the purpose of every idea. Ideas in their finite
form seel: expression and life which can only be found as experience confirms.
Experience therefore is real. Royce holds that all individual experiences,
both human and divine, constitute reality. 50 But this experience is not
real independent of ideas. For experience is a life ftilfillinq ideas.
Royce' s conception of absolute experience is in order for discussion.
6. The leaning of Reality
i. A summary of Royce ' s argument . The development of tiiis t'nosis up
to now has been the result of pursuing Royce *s inter.-rotation of experience.
49. Royce, ..I, I, 36l.
50. Royce, WI, I, 363.
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It was found in the beginning that Royce bases his argument on the meaning
of human experience. Human experience for Royce is what you now have in
conscio i3nes3. But you do not verify all that you have in consciousness.
Tliis unverified experience of the present moment is the result of the nature
of experience. Each fact that you verify refers to another. This reference
is the consequence of the purpose of your ideas. An idea is any conscious
state of mind which embodies a purpose. The purpose involved in your
present experience is unfulfilled. Therefore, your finite ideas seek their
own fulfilment. Ideas have no real e:cbernal meaning. The apparent external
meaning occurs as the intention or purpose of the internal meaning. Every
idea chooses its own object by means of the idea's own selective internal
nature. Thus in trying to fulfill its purpose, each conscious moment of
experience transcends itself while striving for what ought to be and what
mu3t be, if this conscious moment is to have complete fulfillment. This
fulfilment the finite idea never reaches in the temporal order. The com-
pletion of the finite experience is in the realm of absolute experience.
The resulting task is to explain the fulfilment of the purjiose of human
experience. This fulfilment is not a mere total of all humnn experience.
This fulfilment is implied in the limitation of human experience. Nor is
this fulfilment what the mystic experiences when he tends to transcend the
limitation of human experience. Ths mystic according to Royce arrives at
notiling. Thus it becomes necessary to give attention to an analysis of
Royce' s conception of reality.
ii. The social basis of reality
.
Ever:' conscious being has ex-
periences. You, and your brother. But neither of you verifies the
other's experience, nevertheless, you believe that your brother has mean-
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ingful experiences. From ti.ie to time you appeal to your brother's experience
because you believe that his experience is as genuine as yours. Your valid
conception of truth depends on your social relations. "Apart from our social
consciousness...wo men. ..can come to liave no clear conception of truth." 51
You verify for yourself but you appeal to your brother for his verification.
Thus your brother's experience supplements your experience. Xou regard your
brother's experience as real apart from your momentary experience. So, your
brother regards your experience and the experience of all human beings as
real. But the consensus of such experiences is not an organised whole.
Yet the concensus of ail human experience does suggest an ideal. This ideal
which is suggested is an absolutely organized experience.
Tills conceived ideal has many merits. You feel that you ought to ex-
perience wliat your brothers experience if you are to know all the facts that
they know. And for complete knowledge of facts all men ought to experience
more than they do. Therefore, in your most thoughtful moment you appeal to
the greatest ideal. This greatest ideal consists of all the connected ex-
periences of all men combined in a single unit with one unified meaning.
The experiences of all men are but fragments of this complete unity. This
experience absolutely defined, from the stand, oint of its own contents, is
an experience of the infinite series of facts tliat accompany every human
experience. All that human experience fails to verify is verified by this
complete or absolute experience. 53 The task then is to prove the existence
of absolute experience,
iii. Royce'
s
proof for reality of absolute experience. Human experience
is a fragment which hint3 a completely organized experience. Royce proceeds
51. Royce, CG, 33.
52. Royce, CG, 34.
53. Royce, CG, 35.
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on the ground that every experience is interpreted on the basis of appeal
from the fragment to the nost complete. As you apreal to your brothers
experience, and you and your brother appeal to the common body of human
experience, you are advancing to a completely organized experience.-"4' The
evidence for this completely organized experience is the fragment which is
your consciousness. The goal of the fragment is the absolute. If you deny
the existence of the absolute experience, you also destroy the truth of the
fragment. For if your experience is a fragment, there must exist a complete
experience thr<t is conscious of the finite -florid. This final experience is
the inclusion of all that is, for, beyond it there is nothing. 55 The con-
tents of all experience must be presented to some consciousness. This con-
sciousness must of necessity be absolute, since you acknowledge that there
is an absolute reality.
7. Criticism of Royce* s View of TSxperience
The stages of development in Royce' s theory of absolute experience have
been presented. There are two principles which characterize Royce' s theory
of the absolute. The first is that human beings have experience. This
human experience is finite or incoi.v lete. The second principle
asserts that there is an absolute experience which completes every finite
experience. Both the finite and the absolute experience are real. The
purpose of the finite is fulfilled in the absolute. Purpose, then, is the
underlying motive of all experience. The following paragraphs will be de-
voted to criticism of Royce* s theory of absolute experience.
1. John Dewey holds that Royce has built his theory on a misinterpreta-
tion of historical thought. 56 Consequently, Dewey finds tliat Royce 's funda-
54. Royce, Y;I, II, 23-24; SRI, 75; WA 211-215.
55. Royce, CG, 43.
56. Dewey, Art.(1900), 322..
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rental principles are contradictory. If the truly valid idea is presented
in human experience, that which is valid is present actual experience. Thus,
human experience must be real if absolute experience is to be real. There-
fore, all Royce would have is an organization of experience. But in order
to avoid sere organization, Royce conceives human experience -and finite ideas
as meanings that require infinite experience to complete them. Hence, a
contradiction*
For consider: if you say that absolute reality i3 meaning fulfilled in
experience, you would mean that the fulfillment is eternal. The experience
of the absolute fulfills all at once. How then can human experience be
striving by fragments to fulfill absolute meaning? Dewey says that you can
have either, but you cannot have both. If you take human experience alone,
you will get the system of experience as the absolute. But, on the other
hand, if you say that the absolute experiences all at once that which human
beings experience in fragments, you fail to establish reality. 57 BUt Royce
says that when you take the totality of human experience you only get a
fragment, therefore the world would possess no final5.ty,^ Therefore,
tlie explanation which Royce offers to bring human and absolute exv43rience
into harmony seems to present a conflict between the finite and the infinite.
2. Royce arrives at absolute experience by way of human experience.
Every human experience is a partial fulfillment of absolute e:<perience. The
absolute to which human experience refers is determined by the purpose of
human experience. Thus the absolute is onLyk fuller expression of the
finite pirpose than human experience verifies; however, no human experience
57TDev;ey, Art. (1900), 323.
53. Royce, V/I, I, 367.
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is adequate to attain its own purpose.
Every idea partially fulfills a purpose. The human person knows when
experience gives complete measure by means of his unsatisfied will; there-
fore, in a relative sense, he knows reality. If by the unsatisfied human
will the human being knows he has not reached his fulfillment, he infers
that he has the complete measure of reality. The human being while he is
in possession of his life alone sees and 'nows Ms fulfillment. It wotild
seem, then, that the absolute does not fulfill the finite experience, for
the finite is itself real. 59
3. Royce expresses his doctrine of reality in terms of the "Other" of
human experience. This other is the larger experience which includes the
human experience and embodies the human purpose. But, on the other hand,
the human purpose fails of its completion, in social relations, unless
human persons are contrasted one with another. Bakewell hold3 that the same
principle would be necessary to the relation of the human person to the
absolute person.^ Since this contrast is necessary to personal relations,
the absolute person would not be expressing his purpose in the human life,
except the way in which the human person can speak of expressing his pur-
pose in the Lives of other human persons. Ho human being can have his pur-
pose completely fulfilled in the life of another human person, because all
human experience is a fragment. On this basis, then, one begins to doubt
the complete realization of absolute experience in Royce 's system,
4. If men should conclude that Royce has completely established ab-
solute experience, men are under obligation to show that the harmony of the
59T3akev;ell, Art. (1901), 374-395.
60. Bakewell, Art. (1901).

absolute is a harmony of self-reprosentation. x 'iach finite experience
must be freely represented ±n the absolute vdthout conflict. Rut, close
investigation of Royce 1 s system shows that the absolute self and human s^f
are not engaged in any single purpose \vhich requires an infinite series to
complete it.^ In the absolute there is the unique place of the finite.
Each finite being has his orm representative place. Also, there is an
element in the whole system v/hich is represented by another, but this
element is representative of nothing. Therefore, Royce calls this internal
self-representation of an infinite process. And he adds that in his system
every element has tliis internal infinite series. &3 jjy this statement of his
position Royce seems to intend that every finite experience contains an in-
finite process and every finite has its place in the absolute. Hence an
infinite multitude of infinites in an absolute infinite. In this vray Royce
appears to invite greater contradictions in the absolute.
The logical conclusion v/hich has been reached is that Royce 1 s system
of absolute experience presents contradictions between the point of viev; of
the infinite and that of the finite.
ZT7 LCcTaggart, Art. ( 1900) .
62. Royce, 'ill, I, 503-514.
63. Royce, V.I, I, 510.

CHAPTER IV
THE ABSOLUTE AS THE DIVINE I^SRSOM
Royce holds that the concept of being is no abstract idea. No concept
is more concrete than the concept of being. The concept of being is a
living unity of all that is, Royce* s conception of absolute experience
undertakes to bring into harmony ideas and objects. He holds that reality
is an embodied life, a fulfilled meaning, a purpose expressed in experience,
an individual whole that reaches its ov#i purpose. 3- Reality is a "whole
life of an individual. The absolute experience is possessed by divine
personalit;/. The object of this chapter is to describe the nature, the
contents, the activity and the results of absolute experience as a living
person,
1. The Nature and Life of God
i. The unity of the absolute . Royce f s definition of being includes
both the world and the individual. '.fnatever exists is in the realm of ab-
solute experience. In the life of the absolute the divine plan triumphs,
good is suprene, the fscrld is a unit. "God reigns as a rational, self-con-
scious, world-po3sessing, and single Being.* Yet individuals are free,
human persons persist beyond death, and the opportunity for moral action i3
given. The life of God is a complete life of concrete experience which ex-
presses the complete raeaning of ideas that refer to any object. Thus all
individuals, varied as they will be, are subordinate to the absolute. The
differences among ideas result from one universal purpose in the entire
1. Royce, .1, I, 3"7.
2. Royce, I, 393.
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realm of life. 3 Royce maintains that reality is consciously known as the
fulfilment of an idea. That part of reality which is not your present ex-
perience is known to a consciousness which includes yours. There exists no
reality that is not Imown to some consciousness. Thus, all that is is
present to one eternal insight which observes all finite life. This insight
is timeless yet conscious of the whole of time and its meaning. The whole
realm of truth is viewed all at once, and no truth is, that is not known to
God. God is the perfect fulfilment of life which is not other than the
world, but the self-possessed life of the v-orld.^ The v»rld is unified in
the divine person.
ii. God as absolute Knowledge . Everything that is is present to divine
consciousness, \fhen human beings experience an idea, they only verify a
partial meaning of that moments experience, but the v*iole meaning is not
independent of that instants experience. Nor does the individual have any
meaning that is not now completely fulfilled in his present experience, un-
less that meaning i3 present to a knowing process that includes and fulfills
the finite conscious meaning according to the finite being's am real in-
tention.^ As absolute unity, God is the unity of all knowledge. He lias
present before him all questions and their answers. The self-conscio isness
of God is complete.
Nat*., Royce does not say that God foreknows temporal deeds other than
the expressions that finite persons make for him. For neither God nor man
can completely foreknow vjhat a free will will yet do.6 But this does not
3. Royce, '.,1, I, 393.
4. Royce, 7,1, I, 393-399; RAP, 441-44£j SMP, 307.
5. Royce, I, 1, 397.
6. Royce, I, II, 374.
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stop God from having eternal knowledge. At one glance he comprehends the
whole temporal order.
iii. The life of God as all that is, Everything is God. All ideas in-
clude their objects. All ideas are in some mind. And the mind of God in-
cludes all finite mnds. Therefore physical nature as "well as human nature
are both aspects of God. The whole world of past events is in God. And
also the event that is not vet, is in God. In short, the life of God in-
cludes all nature, all minds, all past, present, and all future events.
"The whole of Vrls world stands or falls together. The life of God is
the absolute f dfilnent of all ideas.
Fuller discussion of certain aspects of divine life v.lll be taken up
separately. These separate discussions will include the human self, the
realm of nature, and the evil aspect of divine life.
iv. Trie life of God, as the expression of will . The chief object of the
present discussion is to determine the place of -will in being. The first
assertion is that nothing causes the absolute will. The real knowledge of
the absolute porpOM is its own fulfilment. Nothing logically exists un-
less it consciously fulfills a purpose. The second assertion is that the
divine purpose has two aspects. In the first place, the divine will in-
volves all experience conforming to one meaning; and secondly, it selects
the facts which express the meaning and the exact individual determination of
the meaning itself." The whole world i3 thus the expression of the will of
God. The world for Royce is a whole teleological unit. No fact beyond the
7. Royce, M, I, A13.
8. Royce, V,I, I, Z*6l.
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world is needed to fulfill the world 1 s purpose, for the world is the embodi-
ment of all ideas. The divine vdll is not external to the world but active
in the world. "Y.ill. . .this world expresses, not as if the Divine Will were
an external power. "9 "The idea wills its own complete expression."^
Royce* s conception of the nature and life of God is very inclusive.
The divine life links together all finite lives and the finite world by
means of an eternal vdll. This will gets its expression in each organic
part of the absolute unit.
2, Divine Personality
i. Definition of divine personality. The complete definition of the
nature of divine life involves the assertion of personality. Royce holds
that the universe of discourse regarding personality is essentially etliical.
A person is an individual who strives for his own completion. Royce says
that the divine person is a conscious individual wliose life, from a temporal
standpoint, seeks its completion through action, but from an eternal stand-
point, he consciously reaches his perfection through his present knowledge
of temporal strivings.
ii. The temporal aspect of divine personality. The temporal aspect of
divine personality includes all time-consciousness. This tem]x>ral view of
his person includes the total sphere of consciousness in as much as, in tem-
poral deeds towards completion, this consciousness of the universe passes
from moment to moment of the temporal order, from deed to deed, from con-
9. Royce, $Xj I, 461.
10. Royce, J, I, 386.
11. Royce, WI, II, 418.
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sciousness to consciousness, and from one 3tage to another. Thus the tem-
poral aspect includes every event of consciousness in the temporal world,
whether it be evil will or moral sin.^
iii» ?}ie eternal aspect of divine personality. From the eternal point
of view the divine personality is the infinite whole which includes the
complete endless temporal process. God consciously surveys the temporal
process as his own life. The self of which God is conscious is his own per-
son whose eternal completeness is reached by means of all ethically signif-
icant temporal deeds, the processes of evolution, and the combined activi-
ties of finite selves. The eternal personality of God does not occur at the
end of time as the ros sit of evolution. God is conscious of time, not in
time. The tine—span of human consciousness contains a seeking after the
completeness of God* But, at no instant of time is the perfection of God
reached. The perfection of God is present to the absolute consciousness
only, for the absolute alone can vievf the whole of the process of striving. *3
iv. Relation of divine personality to historical progress . At no in-
stant in the temporal order is the will of God not oppressing itself. Thus,
from an eternal view, every stage of the vxjrld-process is in immediate re-
lation to the whole purpose of God.^'+ There is never no progress in the
universe, for at ever;/ instant some particular finite end is gaining its
temporal accomplishment. In the divine order there is no law of universal
progress in time, so that all temporal things grow, by the will of God, in
ever;/ way better as the world continues. However, Royce recognizes ;noral
12. Royce, RAf
, 457-458; rVI, II, 413; PC, I, 409.
13. Royce, v;i, II, 416-419.
14. Royce, ,.I, II, 420.
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progress in the moral order, because 3ome new form and incomplete expression
of reality continues to pass on to forms that are beyond this new form.
Hence each new form continues to seek. Mew ethical individuals originate
in time, and thus they add their meaning to the world-process. Therefore,
temporal progress is only one phase of the temporal order. Decay is the
otlier. Every sapling becomes timber, thus the destruction of the sapling.
Finite consciousness seeks a goal in the finite future. As the finite
consciousness approaches that goal, progress is being made. The world al-
ways consists of fine attainment of goals. *5 Such goals are reached in spite
of handicaps and evils. But progress might not always be present in time
except in the sense that new goals are sought by finite wills. Yet the
temporal world is no better at any moment than it was at all preceding mo-
ments. The only sense in which mankind's progress on earth is universal is
in respect to human heritage. On this the growth of civilization depends.
The full relation of progress to divine personality may now be summa-
rized. Before the life of the divine person all instants of time, all ages,
ever;/ link in the temporal order, are present at once as members in an in-
finite jjrocess. God's absolute "iaiowledge gives liim insight of the ever-
rolling ages. God verifies all at once, but that Which he verifies is in
the form of an infinite series.
To sum up divine personality, it may be stated that God as absolute
being is absolute person. He is eternal, immanent in the world, transcendent
to the world, possessed with a will, the essence of perfection, and the es-
sence of imperfection. Whatever is i3 a unique part of the divine person.
15. Royce, .-I, II, 423.
16. Royce, «£, II, 42W£5.
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3. Criticism of Royce* 3 View of Divine i orsonality
1. According to M. B* Calkins, Royce' s conception of absolute ex-
perience is a valid doctrine of personal theism. 3he insists that Royce* s
conception of the absolute self is not a conception of a mere collection of
finite selves, but a being possessed of his own consciousness, w.1'11,
thought, and love. ** Tlds absolute consciousness contains all finite con-
sciousness. The experience of God is thus transcendent to, yet not eternal
to finite consciousness. God's consciousness overcomes and supplements
nan's. She concludes that Royce' s conception of God is a doctrine of per-
sonal theism and not an unrecognized existence.
2. Professor LeConte does not question the principles of Royce*? con-
ception of divine J lersonality. He does not deny the validity of Royce* s con-
ception of God. But from the point of view of a scientist, Professor LeConte
challenges Royce* s position by insisting that Royce denies God any attribute
IP
other than absolute knowledge. Nevertheless, this eriticisrr. does not seem
to be valid, since Royce holds that the one attribute, absolute knowledge,
is inclusive of all other possible attributes. As absolute knowledge Royce
holds that God is both the ideas and their objects* Thus Royce seems to in-
clude everything that is.^ That which makes God completely personal in
Royce* s view is God's absoluteness. He includes, in his conception of divine
20personality, all ethical, natural, moral, temporal, and eternal existence.
Thus it appears that Royce* s conception of divine personality is rore in-
clusive than exclusive.
3. Royce' s theory brings together the entire realm of experience. In
lTTRoyce, PHR, 57.
IS. Royce, CG, 68-69.
19. Royce, CG, 7-15.
20. Royce, '.71, II, 413-419.
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the unity of absolute experience Royce insists that he asserts no contra-
diction between the point of view of the human and the divine. Yet the con-
sciousness which he ascribes God is inclusive of human consciousness. The
oneness of consciousness attributes peculiar relations to the universal will.
This makes unfavorable consequences for the problem of personality.
If the -will of man is, in some way, the will of God, it would also be
true that the evil Trill of man is a mrt of God. Hence, it follows that
either the human nil! to do good or evil is unreal, and the infinite -will
alone is real, or the human will is real and all human acts of "still must be
attributed to divine personality. Royce speaks of God as willing in man,
therefore, !tthe freedom of man and the goodness of God will seem to have been
left in an ambiguous situation,"^ Just bow God wills in man and yet man ex-
presses Ills own will, or how man's evil deeds are not the deeds of God seems
to be a great problem for the harmony of a universal will,
4» Royce recognizes God as the absolute person whose relation to human
persons is as an organic whole is related to its constituent parts. This con-
ception produces two peculiar difficulties for assertion of divine personality.
The first is as to whether this conception is truly personal, or impersonal.
Is God, as an aggregate of persons, a pure person? That which makes a person,
according to Royce, is self-consciousness. Can the consciousness of man, in
every or any sense, be called the consciousness of God? Buckham says that
such a conception is "not a true Person, but only the Aggregate of persons. "^2
But if it is '-ranted that Royce* 3 conception of divine personality is truly
personal, one must then face another problem.
The other difficulty which P.oyce's conception of divine personality
21. Jones, Art. (1902), 143.
22. Buckham, Art. (1915), 226.
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faces is the position cf the finite self. If th5.s is a conception of |
completely personal God, then, the human being loses his personality. It is
true that human consciousness is not absolute. But is it also true that
human consciousness is limited because it is a part of absolute conscious-
ness? Can the minds of two persons be one, in the sense that Henry's mind
includes John's? It seems that this personal relationship of the absolute
is hard to express in terms of other persons. If personality is to be
distinguished from environment, and the situation v?bich one experiences is
to be differentiated from ad.tuatd.ons which one believes lx&9 where is the
room for ti?o persons in one individual?
It seems that Royce's conception of divine personality has two unsolved
questions. The first is the possibility of a truly personal divine being.
The second is the possibility of personal relations betv;een£he point of vie*/
of the absolute person and the human person.
23. Brightman, FOR, 3A4-350.

CHAPTER ?
mi NATURAL ASPECT OF DIY3ITS LOT
Mature as an aspect of divine life is here given separate treatment
for two reasons. In the discussion of Royce* s conception of the nature and
life of God as including all aspects of being, thi3 subject could not be
treated fully. Another reason for discussing nature separately is to give
a clear understanding and a fair treatment of the problem. The idea that
nature and man and whatever else exists rake up God is variously con-
ceived
.
1. Royce' s General Conception of Mature
Royce conceives the physical realm that is called nature to be real.,
and therefore a part of the life of God, But in "What sense he conceives
nature to be real is a topic for discussion. In the first place, Royce con-
ceives the reality of the physical world as bound up with the reality of
human experience. Ilature is known to ran as a result of interpersonal
relations. The r aim of physical phenomena is chiefly the realm of human
experience. Man ca not observe alone what science and ccm-non sense call
nature. Nature, therefore, is the product of the cordon obsei^vrition of all
men. For when SflB views other persons, he viev-s then in space and time
along v;ith other objects. Each person views objects and other persons for
himself. The total meaning of the phenomena observed is not verified by
any one man. Thus the complete meaning of such observations is not found
in any man's private experience. ^ For that reason much of that whJLch the
1.
~7>oyce, ..I, II, 165.
2. Ro;-cc, '..I, II, 168-173.

individual fails to verify can be interpreted to Ms by other persons who
observe such objects. To illustrate you ;->sy consider the raoon. Its esdlst—
once goes beyond Henry* e private experience, and persists in his absence,
You, too, can verify the existence of the aoon. Hence, a cannon e;s arienee.
the raoon also exists, in a sense, relatively independent of every jaan. But
the cctsaon observnt:! on of t^e body of aan Gstablistos Uv:; lm?s o.;" t;;o n^ist-
eiice of i^at laen call nature,
2m focial Consciousness as I~v $$3 Sjg Hature
Ban is assured thr-t nature exists apart jfeam nan* s private easperienee,
but he fin. -'j th:- .:t:roe tied up ^&th social experience. 8070* views the
notorial r?orld as the res dt of the description -jf centum agperienca. Mature
is a social tool. The phenotasna .'ire describee' rsore closely as nan > .-jcreases
in skill. Thus civilisation develops a ?ioro sensitive appreciation for sbsi,
but nan describes certain observations in nature nor^ carefully as ho /prows
note skillful. The nature that Industrie.1 art seeks to control is nan* 5
nature. Science seeks theoretical control over nature by establishing certain
unifors descidptions.-5 The uorks of science and industrial art are devoted
to nan's devclo r^sr.t. "en live in type of spiritual relation with one
another. The social order is, therefore, not independent of the social in-
dividual; nor does it consist of a group of independent individuals. Poyce
calls the social jre rc rrrcl.-s-J* Trio social order is corwel rusly alive,
but it is not tho absolute bein~, for it is only a frannent of complete he-
ir.
Mature, then, ic only th-c social nind describes* If the natural
phenoiaaia are taken apart Stom their relation to raon, the:/ fail to ftirrdsh
% &>yee, WI, II, 18M32.
4. *m% ** XT, V&m
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a foundation for the interpretation of their order as the expression of
purwse such that men can understand, *
3. Royce' s Impression of Mature
The general impression which Ro;yce gets from nature can nov; be briefly
stated. The duality of object and idea or of the material 'world and mental
processes is the rss-olt of unverified scientific formulas. Nature has been
exactly described by literary processes that no man has ever verified.
Therefore nature has been called dead while mental processes ?iave been called
living. Royce holds that nature is conscious, but the time-rate of nature^
conscio xsness is different from the time—rate of human consciousness. There-
fore, human beings cannot adjust tliemselves to a live a}
:
preciati.cn of the
inward fluency of nature; yet human consciousness does make ran av;are of
processes in nature. This vast difference in time—rate of consciousness is
what makes it difficult to conceive the time relation between the id^a and
its object.
According to Royce evolution is due to constant intercommunication of
a large number of relatively separate regions of the world of conscious
life. It is an aspect of divine life in development, ° Thus, any object
in nature (horse, rock, tree, etc) is possessed with consciousness. But
man is distinguished from such objects by reason of a different time-span
in consciousness.
4, Summary of the Natural Aspect of Divine Life
Nature as an aspect of divine life now may be su-varized. The realm
of nature is real* It is as real as an;,- other part of God. Its reality is
related to social consciousness. The natural order e>dsts as a system of
57Ro,/co,
.1, II, 135.
6. Royce, ,1, II, 229.
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facts defined by Ideas. Every act of nature j t an expression of purpose.
The c'tdef element of difference between hunar; consciousness and the physical
world is a difference in the time—rate of consciousness. The whole realm
of nature is an expression of e conscious waning in the life of God.
5* Criticism of Royce's Conception of Mature as a Fart of God
1. The un5.forrd.ty of nature is doubtless more than a mere social in-
terest,? Social experience may HWlJ, express the uniformity of the v;orld, but
it seems that the uniformity exists apart from social experience. If there
were no uniform descriptive laws of nature, nature would not be forced to
discontinue her uniform action. It seems that the existing descriptive lavts
of nature are dependent on social relations. But it does not follow that the
existence of nature depends on social Intercourse.
2. Nature in a sense appears to be an expression of divine personality.'
Kature seems to give evidence that God is related to it. Nature produces
many objects of value to persons. If God is the creator of value, then
nature must be in some way united with divine personality.
3. Royce characterises nature as an aspect of divine life wMch differs
from human consciousness only in the sense of time-rate of consciousness.
Just how the human and the natural aspects of one mind can have different
time-rates of consciousness and yet be coherent is perhaps a problem of
complex unity. however, the various aspects cf divine personality can be
harmonized without man's knowledge of the unity. It must be admitted that
"types of being of which we have not the remotest inkling, make up the most
important aspects of the being of God."*? Since there are such unloiown ex—
fTtefogga**, Art. (1902), 559-560.
8. Brightman, FQK, 216-218.
9. Brightrran, BOfi, 218.
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peraenoes of divine personality, these experiences leave room for much
speculation ch the subject-*
The apparent conclusion is that Eoyce's interpretation of nature as
an aspect of divine personal.!ty is enpirically valid* CJod is definitely re-
lated to nature since nature expresses purpose nnd produces value.

chapter vi
THE SVIL ASF3CT OF DIVINE LIF.
The life of God includes all aspects of reality. There is nothing ex-
ternal to God according to Royce 1 s theory. Whatever the existence of evil
furni shes in the sense of a problem, it is a problem in the absolute life
of God, Therefore, it is necessary to find out how Royce harmonizes the
evil element with the good, of God's life.
1, Definition of Evil
Royce has defined various aspects of evil in different places.**- These
various aspects are concentrated in the second series of his Gifford Lec-
tures, In that series Royce defines evil as "a fact that sends us to sone
Other for its MM justification, and for the satisfaction of our will,
Hcyce regards evil as a temporal reality, for it is present to divine in-
sight. Ever?" finite fact sends one to sone other for satisfaction. There-
fore the whole finite order is evil when viewed in relation to temporal
future. All finite life is a struggle with evil but- the eternal order is
perfect,
3
i 2. The Relation of ICvil to Natural Processes
Since evil is confined to the temporal order, the realm of nature will
serve as a good starting point for this investigation. Nature and evil are
real. They are fragments of the absolute life. The whole world stands or
falls together, for all the world is God. Therefore, that which is usually
1. Royce, RAP, 454-459; SRI, 240, 253-254; SRP, 454-469, definition
*ag)li*t. Cf. Royce, SGE, ?5, 14, 5, r , 7, B, 118.
2. Royce, HI, II, 380,
3. Royce, .1, II, 376.

called natural evil is a conscious process in God's .>ife. Hence a brief
discussion will be devoted to Hoyee's conception of evil in nature, and the
purpose that evil serves,
How, since conscious processes go on in nature, P.oyce holds that man
experiences many evils that have no relation to his conscious ideoic. Ju3t
as man echoes the sorrows of society, so lie echoes the evils of nature.
-an
is so united with the rest of the world that ho cannot escape the good and
evil which res-alt from other conscious processes that ai*e striving for the
good of the entire life of "Which man is only a fragment, Finite nature
in striving to fulfill her pur oses, 7.reduces countless evils for «hich
man can give no account.. The conscious span of the human individual i3 too
narrow to comprehend the meaning of nature-is striving which renders evil to
him. 5 But in order that the whole divine plan aright be accomplished, nan
must bear the sorrows of nature. Kan is only enduring part of the struggles
of the raorld with temporal finitude. The source and true meaning of natural
evil is unknown to man, for raan, s present form of consciousness does not give
man insight sufficient to understand the details of such experiences.
3. ^vil as liecessary to a Good aorld
Royce maintains that absolute experience is real. Thus there must of
necessity exist some imperfection of which complete experience is the per-
fection. God' s perfect knowledge must be knowledge of some incomplction.
"If Being is a final whole of experience, there must be that experience of
which it is the whole.'1^ On the other hand, if there were no whole of ex-
4.~yce, \U, II, J>L.
5. Koyce, :i, .7.1, 35a.
6. Royce, VII, II, %h.
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perience, there vould be no imixirfect fragments. "This very presence of ill
in the temporal order is the condition of the perfection of the eternal
order. *• Unity must be complex. In order for the finite to attain the
absolute there must be a striving to complete certain processes. These pro-
cesses are degrees of attainment v»hich cannot be all good or equally valid.
"Were there no longing in Time, there would be no peace in Eternity. "8 The
conclusion implied in Royce* s doctrine is that evil is necessary to a good
world, but not in the sense that evil is necessary to get goodness. Good
and evil are jarts of a whole.
4. Moral Evil and the '.orId
Sin cannot make the eternal order anything other than what it is.
lioral goodness does not make the v*or!d r.ore than perfect, for perfection
means completion. But on the other hand, the moral agent can make his life
better. He can make better his aspect of the complete whole. 9 Evil is
finite. Kan is free to do his cvn will. ".hen man sins, his sin is due to
his evil choice. If man did not choose to sin, this evil would not be.
Hence the world of the individual can be made better or worse as a rcs ilt
of moral freedom.
Each sin is an evil for the finite world to overcome. The moral agent
is free to live up to the best that he knows, but if he sins, "the '.vorld-
order will, indeed, in the end make good the ill. ** According to Royce
somebody must overcome ever;/' moral evil. Therefore, the eternal order i3
free from sin.-'-''- The moral agent is not wholly good after having sinned
7. Royce, WI, II, 385. See also his SRI, 250-254.
8. Royce, WI, II, 386.
9. Royce, WI, II, 362-367.
10. Royce, WI, II, 367.
11. Royce, WI, II, 368.
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even though his sin has been overpowered by good. Royce insists that the
sLnner becomes a "part of the perfect whole in so far as his evil deed is
overruled for good. ***
From God's point of view the whole is good even with the presence of
.moral sin, God does not view the world as subject to change beyond the
present series, for God includes in one instant the whole temporal order.
Yet the temporal order is producing novelties which bring new results for
the llf111 agent. 13
5. Relation of Moral Svil to the will of God
In Royce* s conception the will of God is both identical „with and dif-
ferent from the finite The sins of the moral agent are interpreted
in the light of all life and events that the moral agent ignores, of all
future life for the sinner and his associates, of all deeds of atonement
that shall reconcile the sinner* s will to God 1 3, and of all good tha+ over-
rules evil for good. .hen the sinner's will is so interpreted it is tlie
equal of the will of God. The deed of the sinner at any instant in time
is an evil incident in process. But this evil is confined to the ten: oral
order. As the temporal order passes on the sin will be overcome by good,
hence in the eternal order all is good. All represents the will of God.
The Kill of God overcomes the sinner and condemns the sinner and thereby
presents a perfect will in the eternal order. The man. who sins is not
working together with God. But however far the finite will strays, in the
end it is eternally at home 5ji God's will.
12. Royce, I, II, 363.
13. Royce, .11, II, 369.
14. Royce, ./I, II, 369-370.
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At the same time the finite will is free. The sinner's "acts are his
own, even because God f s ".'ill is in him as the very heart of his freedom, "15
It is the sinner's unit- vdth Ood th-t gives him his freedom. God does not
foreknow in time, except in the sense that finite wills express God. "Fore-
knowledge in time is possible only of the general, and of the causally pre—
determined, and not of the unique and the free."^ The moral agent nay do
as he chooses by virtue of the fact that God*s will regards and includes the
will of the sinner.
6. The Power of God and the Problem of Evil
Royce makes no special appeal to power in his solution to the problem
of evil. God is not apart from the world. He docs not preexist and fore-
know, then create in time a world external to himself. He does not make or
use things external to himself as means to ends. ^-7 God is the i^orld, all
that is real is the life of God.
On the other hand, Royce speaks of good as overruling evil and over-
coming sorrows, '.fan tries to eradicate evil, but Royce says that man cannot
destroy or simply remove from existence, even by omnipotence, the evil of
the world. "Let man, the destroyer, then remember that there is one ill
which, he could not destroy, even if he were God." Hence, Royce r s doc-
trine implies that destruction of evil would mean destruction of God, for
God is immanent in the world.
7. God Justified for vil
The universality of unity demands that evil is a part of the life of
loTTioyce, J, II, 374.
17. Royce, RAP, 458; .1, II, 374.
13. Royce, SRI, 251.
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God, According to Royce evil is a fact which sends ran to some other for
its justification, and for the satisfaction of pan's will. The true source
and meaning of natural evil is unknown to man, yet events in nature produce
evil that ran must suffer. How then is God justified for the existence of
evil?
God cannot remove suffering from the world, for suffering is a part
of God's temporal being. God himself suffers in human sorrows. God knows
all that man knows about man's suffering. "Nothing in our life is external
to the divine life. "^9 God is the completed expression of finite life.
All evil that visits the finite person is evil that visits the infinite per-
son. If God could, he would rid the world of evil, but he cannot rid the
world of his essential parts. Thus God is justified for such evils, because
God la doing the best that he can with his own life. One could not reason-
ably hold God responsible for not having a different life from what he has.
Though the temporal order is evil, God manages to keep evil away from the
eternal order. **
The conclusion here reached is that since the life of God includes
everything in the world, evil is a real part of God. Hence God is justified
for he is doing the best he can with his own person.
8* Summary of the Evil Aspect of Divine Life
In Royce's treatment of the problem of evil these facts are found:
(1) r/vil is a part of the life of God. It is distinguished from good as a
fact which sends man to some other for justification. (2) The whole source
STloyce, v;i, II, 408.
X. Royce, ,/I, II, 379.
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and waning of natural evil are unknov/n to man. (3) "oral evil is a nec-
essary defect in the life of God as a result of individual freedom. $&)
Ciod wills moral evil through finite beings but the evil of the will belongs
to the finite. (5) God cannot bring about the destruction of evil. (6)
Since evil is a part of the life of God, God is justified, for he is doing
all that he can under the circumstances -which his personality affords.
9. Criticism of Royce's Conception of 3vil as a Part of God
There are two criticisms which may be offered concerning Royce's view
of evil. The first is in regard to natural evil and the second, moral evil.
1. Royce's conception of natural evil, as a fact in the eternal ex-
istence of divine experience, is a coherent account of natural- evil. In the
first place, it is Consistent within itself for it recognizes one being as
the ultimate eternal reality in the universe. The whole of experience is
unified in divine personality., In the second place, Joyce's view of natural
evil relieves God of the responsibility for the creation of evil. Royce
does not appeal, to God as creator of, but as immanent in, the world. Kence
God does not create evil for evil is a part of divine experience. Thirdly,
in Royce* s view God does not will natural evil, because natural evil as an
aspect of divine personality could not be a product of will. Lastly, God
is justified for the existence of natural evil, because, as an unwilled
aspect of divine experience, God too suffers ill from the experience of
natural evil. Of necessity, God cannot remove evil from the world. If
divine personality is necessary to a good world, and evil is an element
of divine experience, then natural evil is necessary to a good world. It
does not follow that natural evil is necessary as a contrast to go >d, but
necessary to the conception of divine personality as the ultimate uncreated,

54.
eternal reality of the universe.
2. Eoyce's conception of moral evil as an aspect of divine personality
is contrary to the goocftiW of God, God, in his goodness, may permit free
persons, but his goodness does not make him responsible for moral evil. In
this matter Royce seems to conceive of an immoral being as the primary in-
dividual. Row can God in any sense will moral evil? To make God responsible
for coral evil is to conceive "the divine as incoherent chaos. "21 There
would be no religious validity in such, a conception. To conceive God as
responsible for moral evil is to require another definition of evil and
also of divine personality.
Royce also involves in his theory the idea that moral evil is necessary
to a good "world. To make moral evil necessary to a good world is to require
that God and man, in order to be good, must be evil. To say that both must
be morally evil in order to be good is to destroy the ultimate meaning of
goodness. Good does not require moral evil in order to be good. 22
It must be stated that Royce's account of natural evil seems to be a
coherent view. But Royce* s account of moral evil seems to be incoherent.
21. Brlghtraan, PGR, 220.
22. Brightman, I OR, 261-267.

CHAPTER TO
mm mm aspect op ditots life
This chapter is devoted to an exact account of Royce' s conception of
man in regard to the absolute life of God. Hie chief issues of this chapter
are the origin, freedom, and destiny of man. To accomplish these principal
ideals it vdll be necessary to give Royce' s definition of man or human per-
sonality as an opening paragraph of this discussion.
1. Rome's Definition of Human Personality
From the categor;^ of human selfhood, Royce eliminates thing and sub-
stance, and proclaims the human person to be a life with a meaning. Sach
individual human self is vhat it is by means of contrast with other selves.
The individual human self is, in his intentions, his meanings, his desires,
his hopes, his life, a purposive self that cannot be substituted. The
fundamental feature of Royce 1 s definition of the self is purpose, but for a
full development of this view, the toim/joral, the eternal, and the ethical
meanings must be considered.
1. Temporal view of the human self . Tl »i[n it nTljl viewed the human self
seeks its satisfaction through deeds. * Royce gives no special length of
time as required for the completion of s/iuman self. The human self as
viewed by man is a fragment. It occurs now and no more. In God's view
this self that now occurs is unique. Ho ether event in the universe is like
the present self.
l7~Poyce, :i, II, 426,
2. Royce, ,1, II, 425-A27.
i
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ii, Sternal gjjgg of tlie human self . J^POffl an eternal point of view, the
self is an individual. The human self is not now "wholly conscious of the
true Cleaning of the present moment, but God lias present to him the full mean-
ing of the present instant. Therefore, from God's eternal view the human
self is complete. The full meaning of the entire human self is found in the
complete life of God. 3 Hence, the whole human self requires a unique life-
plan. The length of time for a life-plan is indefinite, for it embodies the
accomplishment of a purpose and each purpose contains purpose.
iii. The ethical self . ?.oirce holds that the human self ha3 an ethical
meaning also. The ethical meaning arises out of the ought of present human
experience. Thus the ethical self is never completed in time. The goal
of the ethical self is never completely reached, for the ethical self passes
on to nevi tasks and in every instant accepts new responsibility. Therefore,
the only complete expression that the ethical self can get requires a union
of the ethical self and. the divine self.^ Royce 1 s definition of the ethical
self implies imi.iortality. For that reason Royce calls the ethical self tlie
only genuine self.
2. The Temporal Origin of Human Selfhood
i. The absolute includes all sclvas . Royce's theory maintains that
all selves are included in the absolute. At the same time the absolute is
a unique self of which all selves are unique parts. 5 ",ach self other than
the absolute self is included in a richer self and includes the lives of in-
complete selves in its own. All of the selves have a special type cf con-
sciousness which gets partial expression.
JTRoyce, V7I, II, 427-428.
4. Royce, ul, II, 430.
5. Royce, V.I, II, 303-304.
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ii. Th-s emergence of the new 3elf . New selves emerge in the ten} -oral
order, but the/ arc not cut off from the absolute.^ TTote, however, Royce
does net cay that this new self which has emerged is a '.Thole or complete
self. Only part of the complete self emerges, for the completion of every
se.lf is in the absolute. Royce thus explains the existence of the new self
either in terns of universal principles, or in terms of particular relations
of finite selves. In the fonasr case God, without the nev/ emergence, -should
not receive full expression of his purpose. In the latter, the finite selves
may require this new self as the result of their past. The latter principle
explains the existence or emergence of selves but it does not explain the
origin. Previous existing forms of consciousness can explain why new forms
emerge but not why they originate. Thus, Hoyce holds that the new self
occurs because of the divine plan for such an existence.''' God is one, yet
many, 3 All selves that emerge in time are only incomplete expressions of
God 1 3 purpose.
3. The "freedom of the Human Se.lf
Royce holds that freedom of the human self is possible. Royce 1 s system
of human freedom is the same as the system employed in the case of the free-
dom of the human will. Sach new self that appears, occurs as the expression
of the will of that self. In as much as this new self is an individual that
expresses a purpose, the purpose is the will of the individual. Hach in-
dividual expresses by his existence nobody* s will but his own.^ The ab-
solute self is a unity of conscious selves. The variety in the absolute
6. Royce, WI, II, 304-305.
% Royce, WI, II, 306-307.
8. Royce. RI, 327-333..
9. Royce, <I, %1$ 330-331.

58.
self is the internal variety of selves and embodiments of purpose present
•within the unity of the absolute self. The many solves must, varied as they
are, win harmony through cooperation. In such cooperation the human self
is active. This activity involves the expression of choice, Vr.en the in-
dividual chooses he is expressing his om freedom. ^0
4. The Immortality of the Human Self
Royce's doctrine of the union of man and God implies the immortality
of the human person. There are three principles on which the doctrine
rests. The first is that the human self is a real conscious individual in
God. In the second place, death to the human self is only possible as an
incident in the life Qf a greater self that is carrying the purpose of the
dead person to completion. In the third place, the ethdcal self, .in the
unity of the absolute, never completes hi 3 task. And so, the ethical self
is no longer finite but infinite. These three principles vd.ll be investi-
gated in the following pages.
^» Tl e human person is real . The first principle in 7oyce's doctrine
of human immortality is the reality of the human self.^ The ways in 'which
the self has been defined in this thesis are brought into harmony in this
assertion. The self of this instant, this temporal series, or of this life
is a real person, for in God and for God it possesses individuality. The
self, however defined, is a unique expression of the divine plan. T!;e htlflm
person i3 not wholly conscious of his meaning in God's life, but God is
wholly conscious. He knows the self as real.
Whan the self is in the eternal world it sees its own completion and
10. ftoyce, '.VI, I, 466-468.
11. Hoyce, CI, 47-49; Vil, II, 433-436*
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knows its fulfilment. In God the human will is fulfilled. Sin form of
consciousness of the human £397*08 in the eternal order is different from
his present form of consciousness. The present form of human consciousness
cannot comprehend the eternal state of the immortal individual. V.hat human
beings do not now verify is in the life of God a knov.n fact. hen the in-
dividual reaches the eternal order he becomes av;are of the meaning of his
whole life.
11. The possibility of cleath . The crucial question in Eoyce 's doctrine
of immortality is, how is denth possible in the life of a real person? This
problem Eoyce approaches on the basis of the self of this instant which is
defined as now and no more.-^ The self of this instant dies with this in-
stant, and so does the self of this day, year, or age. The transient form
of life is not the eternal form of consciousness, therefore the present self
can come to an end. Once an event passes it occurs no more. But death for
Eoyce is not a passing away from all consciousness. Each conscious instant
is a link in the eternal chain. Hence, in the eternal order the purpose,
that was represented by this person who now dies, is carried on to completion.
No self can pass av.'ay except in so far as its purpose is fulfilled in the
larger self that Includes it. Just as the self of tlds instant passes a~
way, so the self of this life may pass away, but through all the passing
the individual remains. The individual is permanent. "I can temporally
die; but I myself, as larger individual, in the eternal world, see why I
die. "13
iii. The ethical 3elf has no end . The third pr5.nciple of Royce's
12. Eoyce, wl, II, 436-443*
13. Royce, IX, II, 442.
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doctrine of human immortality involves the ethical individual. The etliical
self is a person whose life has a single goal, but thnt life is what it is
as the result of contrasts with other persons. *4 Each deed of the et'nical
*
person, by emphasizing the contrasts, provides opportunity for other deed3.
In thi3 way the moral task can never be completed. 2very act or deed pro-
duces another. The otliical person, even in God, seeks a frqajppra3. future.
Now, Royce holds tteit, though real, all selves, except the ethical
self, are finite. »3 ".'.hen the et'nical self wins its complete place in the
life of God, it becomes infinite—an infinite part of the absolute. The
ethical self in the eternal world differs from God in that the etliical per-
son requires other selves as supplements and contrasts. Nevertheless, the
ethical person has the same infinity of structure, and the same variety of
content as God. For that reason Royce says that the ethical person in the
eternal order is related to God as a part equal to the whole wherein it
dwells. 16
5. Criticism of Royce 1 s Conception of Human Personality
1. Royce holds that the human person is properly defined in ethical
terms. The human self is neither caused nor teleologically determined by
another. The individual exists, in a sense, as the expression of nobody's
will but his own. But at the same time Royce holds that the human self
exists as the expression of the one divine will. Royce goes on to say that
the human self has its will in the will of the divine. But Bakewell in-
sists that this view of the human self contradicts the divine will.^-7 If
14. Royce, M, II, 444.
15. Royce, ,1, II, 446.
16. Royce, ,1, II, 452.
17. Bakewell, Art. (1901), 397. Cf. Robet, Art. (1907).
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not, then, the divine person takes advantage of the human pe:-son.
2. Royce gives an account of the genesis or temporal origin of the
human self. This raises a question in one's mind, since the human self is
neither causally no-r teleologically determined.-*-^ Also, note that the
ethical self has an eternal mission. How, then, can the ethical self he
said to originate in time? Moreover, the ethical self in the eternal order
is infinite. If infinite means boundless, how can it be anything less
than infinite at any time?
3. Royce claims no mystical ciction in the union of the human
and the divine persons. Thl3, he holds, is possible on the foundation that
man has his place in God. hence, when man unites with. God, man is only
coming to himself. The human self in the temporal order is never complete.
Yet the completion of nan is in God who is not wholly external to man.
When this union takes place, it must be of a mystical nature, unless the
human and the divine are ontologically equal. *9 ..hile on the other hand,
if man is eternally real, it is difficult to see how he has a temporal ori-
gin. How if man's union vdth God is merely man's union vdth the rest of
himself, it seams strange that God is involved in the union if God and :ran
are genuine persons.
U* ' cT ggart fails to see how Royce can give meaning to one self in
another. According to Royce all selves have purposive relations with the
absolute. All selves are also in the absolute self. But Royce does not
show ho?; one can know that the end of each finite self is not to efface it-
self and disappear as a means to something else.^
l^TBakewell, Art. (1901), 397.
19. Bakewell, Art. (1901).
20. HcTagart, Art. (1900).
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Agreement is reached between Royce and MeTaggart on the nature of
reality. Both agree that reality is conceivable only as conscious experience.
The tv;o also agree that finite beings are not conscious of all that is real.
But they disagree on the relation of the human person to reality. "cTag-
gart does not believe that there is anything that human beings should now
call real which human beings never were and. never wall be conscious of.^l
5. The crucial point of Royce 1 s position is the possibility of human
freedom. H. "... Cai.kins fails to understand how Royce can speak of human
per3orJ beinr free to withstand God's will when by selective attention of
God all beings exist. She holds that Royce' s treatment of human freedom
may be psychological but not metaphysical. Nevertheless, Professor Bright-
man says that human freedom is possible in the system of Royce since Royce
holds that when a human person performs a free act, the human person is the
absolute person in action.^ However, in Royce' s argument for individual
freedom he holds that an individual is such that none other can take his
place. Yet all individuals (human) are in the absolute individual as
'inique parts of a unique whole. Human persons partly express the divine
will.25 But, the vaestion persists as to what Royce means by:
The divine will wills me, precisely in so far as it wills that,
in each of my individual deeds, I should then and there ex-
press n£,r own unique, and in so far free choice. 26
Does he mean to assert that the divine will can be expressed by the human
2i7Hc?aggart , Art . ( 1900)
22. Royce, HiR, 63.
22. Brightnan, FOR, 220.
24. Royce, CI, 66-67.
25. Royce, SJ, I, 464.
26. Royce, AR1, 160.
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person, and yet the individual is that -which will pervit no substitution
because of its unique quality?27 The possibility of the human person ex-
pressing the will of the divine person seems to involve one will: either
the divine person in action or a human person in action. If it is the
divine person in action, •where is the free action of the human person? On
the other hand, if it is the human person in action, can it be rightly said
that the divine person is acting?
6. There is a ouestion as to whether the human person fully realises
his individuality. Human ideas are not fully expressed by human be-jr. ;s.
These ideas according to Royce appeal to the absolute system, and they are
not independent of this appeal. The object that is to defeat the incon>~
plete human Mill is the whole vdll and fulfilled purpose of the human will
deteminately expressed. The human will as it now is, is transient and can
fail in any partial way of realisation. This failure is due to the fact
that the human being is not wholly aware of his own will. It does not mat-
ter how far the finite vdll v/anders in its temporal experience; the ful-
filment of the life encompasses it. Therefore, McTaggart^ insists that
ever;- act of will ray be a fulfilment of will, and every volition may be an
experience of reality, hence, reality could not be absolutely alien to the
human will and 210 ideal could be totally void of reality. The will to know
i3 an element in the whole system of volition. Thu3 it is conceivable th.*>t
the element may be satisfied without the satisfaction of the whole system.
Hence the eternal fulfilment of the human will is not here realized. For
a man may know the world to refuse satisfaction to his demands for love,
hence the v?orld gives man knowledge of his will but not satisfaction of his
27. oyce, CI, 67.
23. ?.:cTaggart, Art. (1900).
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vjiil for love. How then can the will which knows the fulfilment of mat*
9
desire for love, be rightly called the human trf.ll?
7. Royce says that the human person is immortal. This seems to follow
logically from Royce 's s?/stem, since the human person is counted realj and
3ince death is possible only through the survival of the very essence of
human personality. The apparent condition of Lmmortality is that the finite
self "seeing its own imperfections, is seeking for truth beyond itself, "^9
Tlie immortal person is one who begins a moral battle which must be fought
out, 3° for the ethical self is the immortal being. 31
The question v/hich arises in one's mind is relative to the nature of
the immortal individual. In the first place, the human person is real and
therefore a part of God. Secondly, the result of human reality demands that
physical death does not put an end to human personality. In the third place,
the ethical terms of Royce 1 s doctrine of immortality evade physical death.
But, in this immortal state, the human person is said to be in the divine
r>erson as a part equal to the whole, in the sense that the paints of a com-
plete whole contain the qualities of the whole. In this way the ethical
task that has been started is eternally carried on in divine personality,
for divine personality alone can give full expression to the ethical in-
dividual. 32 Tne question then is: Can this be truly called human imr/or-
tality? It seems that tlie only truly existing person is the divine person,
since the divine person alone can give expression to eternal activity.
The foregoing comments may be regarded as reaching the following con-
clusions: Royce clearly defines human personality, but the logical rela-
29. Royce, CI, 62.
30. Royce, CG, 326.
31. Royce, 7*1, II, 446-452.
32. Royce, CG, 324-326; V/I, II, 447-452; CI, 44-63.
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tions betvfeen the human and the divine seem to bo stated in a contradictory
way. If the divine person can be thought of as in the baclcground and the
human person in the foreground of the same personality, then, Royce makes
provision for freedom of individuals. Lastly, Royce does show that human
immortality is possible in his system.

CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCTUSIOUS
This investigation is a consideration of the conception of God as
found in the philosophy of Josiah Royce. The foimdation of his doctrine
is human experience from which he infers absolute experience, -hen Poyee
establishes his proof for the reality of absolute experience, he proceeds
to assert divine ]>ersonality. His conception of divine personality in—
eludes all existence. The natural, evil, human, and other aspects of di-
vine consciousness find their unique places in the absolute.
Thus Royce views the absolute as the being of a personal God who is
eternal, iiamanent in and transcendent to the v«>rid, The will of God is con-
sidered as a perfect will which contains the imperfect human will. There-
fore, all man's sins and errors are conceived as belonging to God, As the
will of God contains the will of man, so the divine person contains the
human person. But the divine and the human, on occasions, seen to alter-
nate their activity. Both the human and the divine are real and therefore
eternal.
In this thesis the following conclusions have been reached:
1. That Royce* s system of absolute experience presents contradictions
from the point of view of the infinite and. the point of view of the finite,
2, That Royce 1 s conception of divine personality gives evidence of
unsolved questions.
i. The truly personal character of the divine self is not proved
beyond doubt.
ii. There can be no personal relation between the point of view
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of the divine and thr.t of the human, since they are the
same rx-rson.
3. Thp.t Poyce's conception of nature as an aspect of divine con-
sciousness is valid.
4. That Royce gives a coherent account of natural evil.
5. That Royce' c ascription of moral evil to divine will is inco-
herent.
6. That Royce give3 a clear definition of human personality, hut
the personal relations between the divine and the human standpoint seem
ambiguous.
i. The human person is not clearly distinguished from the divine
person in their logical relations,
ii. The conditions of individual freedom in Royce' 3 system are
problematic.
iii. Since the human person is merged into the divine person,
human immortality is made possible.
Therefore, the idea of God in the philosophy of Royce is not a co-
herent view of personal theism.
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